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ABSTRACT
What is the seigniorage-maximizing level of inflation? Four models formulae
for the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate (SMIR) are compared. Two
sticky-price models arrive at very different quantitative recommendations
although both predict somewhat lower SMIRs than Cagan’s formula and a
variant of a .ex-price model due to Kimbrough (2006). The models differ
markedly in how inflation distorts the labour market: The Calvo model
implies that inflation and output are negatively related and that output is
falling in price stickiness whilst the Rotemberg cost-of-price-adjustment
model implies exactly the opposite. Interestingly, if our version of the Calvo
model is to be believed, the level of inflation experienced recently in
advanced economies such as the USA and the UK may be quite close to
the SMIR.
JEL Classification: E4; E52; E61; E63.
Keywords: Price stickiness; Revenue maximizing inflation; Inflation tax;
Seigniorage; price dispersion.
1. Introduction
What is the seigniorage-maximizing level of ination? The answer provided by
Cagan (1956) was to set the ination tax rate equal to the inverse of the interest
semi-elasticity of the demand for money. Modern general equilibrium treatments
of the issue allow that question to be posed in richer theoretical environments. For
example, Easterly et al. (1995), endogenized the money demand function via a
cash-in-advance constraint resulting in a variable semi-interest elasticity of money
demand. They argued that this qualies in important ways the conclusions of the
Cagan rule. Recently, Kimbrough (2006) has argued that, in addition to mod-
elling money demand, it is important to model the labour-leisure choice. Failing to
do so ignores the real e¤ects of ination and hence its impact on the ination-tax
base. He develops a exible-price, general equilibrium model with an endogenous
labour-leisure choice and with a role for money in reducing transactions costs as-
sociated with consumption. He argues that ination reduces the e¤ectiveness of
money and causes a substitution toward leisure. The combined e¤ect (on money
demand and labour supply) implies a maximizing level of seigniorage lower than
prescribed by the Cagan rule.
This paper incorporates the potential for price stickiness to impact the seignior-
age maximizing ination rate (SMIR). Two versions of popular models of price
stickiness are developed, the Calvo (1983) model and the Rotemberg (1982) quadratic-
costs-of-price-adjustment model (see also Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004). Simi-
lar along some obvious dimensions, these models nevertheless di¤er in important
ways on how ination distorts the real economy. Consequently, they arrive at
quantitatively di¤erent conclusions regarding the SMIR. The quantitative conclu-
sions of the sticky-price models are compared with a close variant of the ex-price
model developed by Kimbrough (2006) and with the Cagan rule. The key issue
that is highlighted is how ination distorts equilibrium in the labour market and
so a careful decomposition is provided of the impact of ination on the labour
markets in the general equilibrium environments developed. Interestingly, the
sticky-price models generally suggest a relatively low SMIR; in particular the
Calvo model often recommends an ination rate quite close to that seen recently
in many advanced economies, such as the US and the UK.
The rest of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 sets up a model
similar to Kimbrough (2006) but extended to incorporate monopolistically com-
petitive producers. The section briey derives the Cagan rule before modelling
rms price setting behavior following Calvo (1983). Section 3 introduces the
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Rotemberg model. Section 4 contains a detailed comparison of the labour mar-
kets and of the relationships between ination and output in the models that
we develop. The seigniorage maximizing ination rates across frameworks are
calculated and compared in section 5. Section 6 o¤ers some brief conclusions.
Appendices contain a number of derivations and proofs referred to in the text.
2. The core model
The single good, exible-price, general equilibrium model with an endogenous
labour-leisure decision, of Kimbrough (2006) is generalized by introducing mo-
nopolistically competitive producers. That additional structure is to facilitate
comparison across models as presently we shall incorporate price stickiness. First,
the Calvo model is adopted where some rms are permittedto change prices and
some are not; in other words there is price-dispersion. Then a sticky price model
is developed with no such price dispersion, but where changing prices is costly
(the Rotemberg model).
There are a large number of identical agents in the economy who evaluate their
utility in accordance with following criterion:
E0
1X
t=0
tU(Ct; Nt(i)) = E0
1X
t=0
t
 
log(Ct)  
1 + v
Z
i
Nt(i)di
1+v!
: (2.1)
Et denotes the expectations operator at time t,  is the discount factor, Ct is
consumption andNt(i) is the quantity of labour supplied to rm i. v  0measures
the labour supply elasticity while  is a preferenceparameter.
Consumption is dened over a Dixit-Stiglitz basket of goods
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
: (2.2)
The price-level, Pt, is known to be
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
. (2.3)
The demand for each good is given by
Yt(i) =

pt(i)
Pt
 
Y dt ; (2.4)
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where pt(i) is the nominal price of the nal good produced in rm i and Y dt denotes
aggregate demand.
Agents face the following ow budget constraint
PtCt (1 + T (Mt=Pt=Ct)) +Bt +Mt = [1 +Rt 1]Bt 1 +Mt 1 + PtwtNt +t: (2.5)
Money is held because it helps reduce transaction costs. In order to purchase C
units of consumption, the consumer need to spend (1 + T (mt))C. The transaction
cost function is given by
T = T (mt); T
0 < 0; T 00 > 0;
where mt =Mt=Pt=Ct: A prime denotes dT (mt)=dmt: As all agents are identical,
the only nancial assets traded in equilibrium will be those issued by the scal
authority. Here Bt denotes the nominal value at the end of date t of government
bond holdings, 1+Rt denotes the nominal interest rate on this risklessone-period
nominal asset, wt denotes the real wage in period t (all agents supply the same
labour to each rm, and rms pay the same real wage to labour), and t is a lump
sum transfer from rms in the form of dividends.
The rst-order conditions imply a labour supply equation (2.6)
 U
0
N (Ct; Nt)
U 0C(Ct; Nt)
= tN
v
t Ct =
wt
1 + T (mt)  T 0(mt)mt ; (2.6)
an (inverse) money demand equation
T 0(mt) =
 Rt
1 +Rt
=  i;
and a consumption Euler equation
Et

U 0C(Ct+1)Pt (1 + T (mt)  T 0(mt)mt)
U 0C(Ct)Pt+1 (1 + T (mt+1)  T 0(mt+1)mt+1)

=
1
1 +Rt
= 1  it; (2.7)
where we dene it := Rt1+Rt :
Following Kimbrough we introduce the money demand function k(it)
mt = k(it) = inv( T 0);
which implies that k0 =   1
T 00 < 0: The complete markets assumption implies the
unique nominal stochastic discount factor:
Qt;t+k =
kU 0C(Ct+1)Pt (1 + T (mt)  T 0(mt)mt)
U 0C(Ct)Pt+k (1 + T (mt+k)  T 0(mt+k)mt+k)
; (2.8)
where
Et fQt;t+kg = Et
kY
j=0
1
1 +Rt+j
:
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2.1. Seigniorage maximization
The government maximizes the net present value of its revenue from seigniorage
as measured by:
St = Et
1X
k=0
dt;t+k
Mt+k  Mt+k 1
Pt+k
; (2.9)
where dt;t+k is real discount factor dened as dt;t+k =
t+kY
s=t
1
1+rs
: Inverse ination can
be rewritten as 1
t
=

1+rt
1+Rt 1

= (1 + rt) (1  it 1) : Therefore, we may rewrite
the preceding expression as
St = Et
1X
k=0
dt+k
Mt+k
Pt+k
it+k   M 1
P0
= Et
1X
k=0
dt+kCt+kk(it+k)it+k   M 1
P0
: (2.10)
In steady state, assuming that 1
1+rs
= ; the ination tax i is chosen to maximize
seigniorage
S(i) = C(i)k(i)i: (2.11)
2.2. Cagans rule for the SMIR
Cagans rule is very familiar to monetary economists. It is derived from (2.11) as-
suming that the real interest rate and consumption are givens. Then the revenue
maximization problem is simply equivalent to the maximization of k(it+k)it+k in
each period. From that we immediately derive Cagans rule:
iCagan =   k(iCagan)
k0(iCagan)
; 8t:
If the money demand elasticity is given by ; then the optimalination tax is
iCagan = 1=: Lucas (2000) suggests a plausible value for  is in the region of 5 7;
implying the seigniorage maximizing ination should be in the range 12  20%.
However, Kimbrough (2006) points out that high ination may compromise the
e¤ectiveness of real money balances in reducing transaction costs. The upshot is
a substitution into leisure and a contraction of the seigniorage tax base. Thus, the
seigniorage maximizing ination rate will be lower than predicted by the simple
Cagan rule. We explore the quantitative di¤erence below.
However, sticky price models may suggest additional negative real e¤ects from
ination; other things constant, a higher ination rate may mean that rms oper-
ate less e¢ ciently, shrinking further the tax base. In the Calvo model that shrink-
age is quite severe, but may be much less so in the cost-of-adjustment model. The
following analysis works out the details of these models.
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2.3. Representative rm: factor demand
Let us assume that labour is the only factor of production. Firms are monopo-
listic competitors who produce their distinctive goods according to the following
technology
Yt(i) = At [Nt(i)]
1=
; (2.12)
where Nt(i) denotes the amount of labour hired by rm i in period t, At is a
productivity shifter. It is assumed that  > 1 so that there is diminishing returns;
that assumption is important as discussed below.
The demand for output determines the demand for labour. Hence one nds
that
Nt(i) =

Pt(i)
Pt
 
Yt
At

: (2.13)
It follows that the total amount of labour demanded will be
Nt =
Z
Nt(i)di =

Yt
At
 Z 
Pt(i)
Pt
 
di = Nt t; (2.14)
where t h i is a measure of price dispersion:
t h i 
Z 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 
di: (2.15)
In this simple set-up, were all rms given the chance to re-price at any instant in
time, they would all choose the same price. In that case, with all prices similar,
for a given level of output the labour supply is
Nt =
 
A 1t Yt

: (2.16)
Substituting (2.16) into (2.14) one receives
Nt = t

Yt
At

: (2.17)
This corresponds to the amount of labour which would be employed to produce
quantity Yt should prices not be equal across rms. Finally, it follows from (2.6)
that the equilibrium wage can be written as
wt = (1 + T + ik)tCt
v
t

Yt
At
v
: (2.18)
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2.4. Costly price adjustment: The Calvo model
The Calvo (1983) approach to modelling price-stickiness is familiar. Each period
a measure, 1   , of rms is allowed to adjust prices. Those rms choose the
nominal price which maximizes their expected prot given that they may have to
charge the same price in k periods time, with probability k.
Since rms are cost-takers, the price setting problem can be characterized as
follows:
max
p0t
Et
1X
k=0
kdt;t+k
 
Yt+k

p0t
Pt+k
1 
  wt+kA t+kY t+k

p0t
Pt+k
 !
; (2.19)
where p0t is the new price charged by all rms updating prices. wt is the real wage,
wt = Wt=Pt; and dt;t+k is the real discount factor
dt;t+k =
kUc(Ct+k) (1 + T (mt)  T 0(mt)mt)
Uc(Ct) (1 + T (mt+k)  T 0(mt+k)mt+k) :
The rst order condition with respect to p0t(i) implies

p0t
Pt
1+( 1)
=

   1
Et
1P
k=0
()kUc(Ct+k)
h
wt+kA
 
t+kY

t+k(
Pt
Pt+k
) 
i
 t+k
Et
1P
k=0
()kUc(Ct+k)
h
Yt+k(
Pt
Pt+k
)1 
i
 t+k
; (2.20)
where  t+k  (1 + T (mt+k)  T 0(mt+k)mt+k) 1. The price index then evolves
according to a law of motion
Pt =

(1  ) p01 t + P 1 t 1
1=(1 )
; (2.21)
which implies the following relation between the optimal relative price and ina-
tion
p0t
Pt
=
 
1   1t
1  
!1=(1 )
: (2.22)
Because the relative prices of the rms that do not change their prices in period t
falls by the rate of ination, one derives a law of motion for the measure of price
dispersion
t = t 1

t + (1  )

p0t
Pt
 
: (2.23)
In equilibrium market clearing requires
Ct (1 + T (mt)) = Yt (2.24)
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which together with (2.18) yields an expression for the real wage in terms of
production:
wt =
(1 + Tt + itk(it))
1 + Tt
Yt
v
t

Yt
At
v
: (2.25)
This expression for the real wage will prove useful in Section 4.
2.4.1. Steady state
By combining (2.20) with (2.22), and substituting for the real wage (2.25), the
relation between output and the ination is recovered:
1  
1   1
1   1
1  
1 + T (i)
1 + T (i) + ik(i)
   1

= Y (v+1): (2.26)
Price dispersion, ; can be easily computed using the steady state version of the
law of motion (2.23)
 =
(1  )
(1  )

1   1
1  
 
 1
:
Hence, (2.26) can be rewritten compactly as
Y (v+1) =
h()(i)
v+1()
; (2.27)
where we dene h() := 1 

1  1
1  1
1  , and (i) :=
1+T (i)
1+T (i)+ik(i)
: It is straightfor-
ward to show that h() increases with ination and price stickiness. Hence, the
function h() represents the stimulating e¤ect of ination; since prices are sticky,
the aggregate price level is lower than in the case of price exibility. The function
(i) reects the transaction costs which consumers have to pay; (i) decreases in
ination and reduces demand. Finally the price dispersion term, v+1(); cap-
tures the direct costs of production, which reduce supply as ination rises. It is
easy to show that v+1()  1 and increases in both ination and price stickiness,
:
Proposition 2.1. Output declines in the degree of price stickiness, ; for  > 1:
A small increase in ination has o¤setting e¤ects: On the one hand it reduces
the monopolistic price distortion, tending to boost equilibrium output. However,
higher ination increases price dispersion, pushing equilibrium output lower (for
reasons discussed later). By direct di¤erentiation one can show that the negative
e¤ects associated with price dispersion dominate.
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Proposition 2.2. Ination and output are negatively related in the Calvo model
for Cagan >  > ; where  is dened by 
1   1  1   ( 1)
(1  ) =
(   1) (1  )

(2.28)
and  < (1=)1=( +1) ; while Cagan represents the SMIR following Cagans
rule.
Both the upper and lower bounds in proposition 2.2 represent su¢ cient con-
ditions. The upper bound corresponds to the SMIR in Cagans model while the
lower bound represents the ination threshold which makes the negative e¤ect
from price dispersion dominate the positive e¤ect of a reduction in the monopo-
listic distortion represented by h(): Using the calibration of Section 5,  is of
the order of magnitude of one third of one percentage point. See appendix 9.2 for
the proof of the propositions.
Moreover, by combining the expression for seigniorage, (2.11), with market
clearing, one can derive an expression for the steady state level of seigniorage
St(i) =
ik(i)
1 + T (i)
Y (i): (2.29)
Since equilibrium output declines in price stickiness, ; seigniorage will also decline.
Consequently, since the exible-price model is nested to the Calvo model by set-
ting  = 0; one concludes that for any given level of ination, seigniorage revenue
in the Calvo model is lower than predicted by the exible-price framework.
It follows that the SMIR is lower in the Calvo model than in a model with
exible prices. Combining (2.29) with (2.27) one establishes the following relation
between seigniorage revenues
S_Calvo() = S_flex() ();
where () =

h()
v+1()
1=(v+1)
is a positive, declining function of ; for  > 
(See Appendix). Therefore at the the level of ination which maximizes seignior-
age in the exible-price model, flex, seigniorage in the Calvo set-up is declining.
Hence, by reducing ination the government will be able to increase seigniorage
revenue. That establishes the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. The seigniorage-maximizing ination rate is smaller in the
Calvo model than in the exible price model for flex > :
Propositions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 do not hold in the costs-of-price-adjustment
model, as we now show.
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3. Costly price adjustment: The Rotemberg model
We follow Rotemberg (1992) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and now in-
troduce sluggish price adjustment by assuming that the rm faces a resource cost
that is quadratic in the ination rate of the good it produces:
Price adjustment cost =

2

Pt(i)
Pt 1(i)
  1
2
;
where  > 0 is a measure of price stickiness.
The rm sets its price to maximize the net present value of future prots:
maxEt
1X
k=0
dt;t+k
 
Yt+k

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
1 
  wt+kNt+k(i)  
2

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k 1(i)
  1
2!
:
The rst-order condition with respect to Pt(i)
Pt
can be derived in a straightforward
way (as detailed in the appendix) and, since all the rms charge the same price,
in equilibrium Pt(i)
Pt
= 1: That gives rise to the Phillips relation:
(   1)Yt   wtA t Y t + t (t   1) = Etdt+1 (t+1 (t+1   1)) :
When wages are exible, the average wage is given by
wt = (1 + T + ik)Ct

Yt
At
v
: (3.1)
The cost of price adjustment will be transferred to the consumer through a reduc-
tion in prot share. Consequently, the household budget constraint implies the
following market clearing condition
Ct =
Yt   2 (t   1)2
(1 + Tt)
: (3.2)
Let ination be constant and let dt;t+t = . It follows that output is solved for
using

(1 + T (i)  k(i)i)
(1 + T (i))

Y   
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)   (   1)Y (3.3)
=  (1  ) (   1) :
By direct di¤erentiation of (3.3), one can prove propositions 3.1 and 3.2 (see the
appendix for the details). These imply that the relationships between output,
ination and price stickiness in the Rotemberg model di¤er in important ways
from those described in Propositions 2.2 and 2.1 for the Calvo set up.
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Proposition 3.1. In the model with costly price adjustment, output increases
with price stickiness, for any given level of ination.
Proposition 3.2. In the model with costly price adjustment, output increases
with ination, for any level of ination smaller than Cagans SMIR.
Proof. See the appendix and the further discussion in Section 4.
Dening seigniorage as follows
St(i) =
ik(i)
1 + T (i)

Y (i)  
2
(   1)2

;
one nds that, generally speaking, equilibrium output increases with ination as
well as with price stickiness. However, the e¤ect on consumption and seigniorage
is ambiguous. It depends crucially on the concavity of the production function,
; and the elasticity of labour supply, : Those two parameters are responsible
for the convexity of the average labour costs. Indeed, from (3.1) one can conclude
that the average labour cost is given by
Cost(Y ) = wN = (1 + T + ik)C

Y
A
(v+1)
;
from which one calculates the cost elasticity of supply:
@Cost
@Y
Y
Cost
=  (v + 1) :
When that elasticity is small, the seigniorage-optimizing ination rate may be
higher in the Rotemberg model than in the exible-price framework.
Proposition 3.3. When the "convexity of average labour cost" is small,  (v + 1) '
1; consumption and seigniorage revenue increase with  for any given level of in-
ation.
Proof. See the appendix.
However, for a reasonable calibration, the seigniorage maximizing ination is
indeed lower in the Rotemberg model than in our variant of Kimbroughs ex-price
framework.
The key to understanding the results above turns, to a large degree, on how the
di¤erent models perceive ination to disrupt the workings of the labour market.
In the following Section we spell out in detail some of the key e¤ects.
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4. Ination and labour market distortions
Labour supply: Besides the direct e¤ect of ination on consumption via
higher transaction costs, ination tends to introduce signicant distortions into the
labour market in all three general equilibrium models. As is clear from Kimbrough
(2006), workers demand higher wages for a given level of labour supply
ws_flext = (1 + T + ik(i))CtNvt ;
and for a given level of production, the wage is determined as
ws_flext =  1(i)Yt

Yt
At
v
;
where  1(i) increases with ination on the interval [1; icagan]:
By contrast, in the Calvo model with relative price distortion, more labour is
required for the same production level as in the exible-price environment:
Nt = t

Yt
At

>
Yt
At
:
Hence, in the Calvo model, for given level of production, the wage demanded by
labour increases in ination:
ws_Calvot =
(1 + T + ik(i))
1 + T
Yt
v
t

Yt
At
v
=  1(i)Ytvt

Yt
At
v
;
ws_Calvot = vt (i)  ws_flext (Yt) > ws_flext (Yt) ;
where vt (i) > 1 and is increasing in ination.
However, in the Rotemberg model there is no relative price distortion, although
consumers bear the costs of price adjustment. So,
ws_Rotemberg =  1(i)

Yt
At
v 
Yt   
2
(t   1)

;
ws_Rotemberg = ws_flext (Yt)  
2
(t   1) 1(i)

Yt
At
v
< ws_flex:
In other words, for a given level of output, wages are lower in the Rotemberg
model as compared with the exible-price model; the supply schedule of labour
in wage-output space shifts to the right.
Demand for labour: In the exible-price model of Kimbrough (2006),
the real wage is simply the marginal product of labour, wd_Kimbrought = 1Y
1 :
12
In our version with monopolistic distortion and exible prices the wage will be
smaller wd_flex =  1

wd_Kimbrough:
In the Calvo model one has to use the Phillips relation to recover an expression
for the steady-state real wage:
wd_Calvo =

1   1
1  
 1 +
1  1  
1   1
1

Y 1 
   1

(4.1)
= wd_flex g() < wd_flex
where g() :=

1  1
1 
 1 +
1  1 
1  1 < 1: By direct di¤erentiation, one can
show that g() is decreasing in  and decreasing in ination for  >  (see
appendix 9.1). Therefore, in the Calvo framework, rms pay lower wages than in
the exible-price model.
The steady state Phillips relation in the Rotemberg model yields
wd_Rotemberg =
1

(   1)

Y 1 t + Y
1 
t
1

(1  ) t (t   1) =
= wd_flex+ Y 1 t
1

(1  ) t (t   1) > wd_flex
So in this set-up rms are willing to pay higher wages for producing a given level
of output; the demand schedule of labour in wage-output space shifts to the right.
So, a useful way to sum up the results of this section is as follows: In the
Calvo model the supply curve is shifted up and the demand curve is shifted down
as ination rises compared to the exible price model. The unambiguous result
is that equilibrium output is necessarily lower than in the exible price model.
However, in the Rotemberg model the opposite is true: both the supply and the
demand curves are shifted to the right, as shown on gure 1.
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Figure 1: Comparative analyses of the Labour Markets
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5. The seigniorage maximizing ination rates across frame-
works
To get a feel for the SMIRs implied by the di¤erent models, we now turn to
parameterize the models in a (hopefully) sensible way. We assume that T (i) has
the same functional form as in Kimbrough (2006):
T (i) =    e i (1 + i) ;
k(i) = e i:
We take our calibrated parameters from existing work. Lucas (2000) suggests  to
be between 5 and 9 for the USA. So, for our benchmark we will adopt  = 7; and
 = 0:3; the latter is also consistent with Lucass work. The other parameters we
adopt are from Woodford (2003) and are standard for the calibration of the Calvo
model. Price stickiness is given by  2 f0:125; 0:25; 0:5; 0:6g ; the elasticity of
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substitution is  = 8; and the labour supply elasticity is v = 1:7, while production
elasticity of labour is  = 1:6:
We choose a value for the cost of price adjustment in the Rotemberg model,
, by requiring that its value equalize the slopes of the Phillips curves across the
Rotemberg and Calvo models. Note that the value is signicantly larger than the
one used in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), i.e.,  = 4:25. Table 1 summarizes
our calibration parameters.
Table 1: Calibration parameters
Symbol value Description
 0:96 subjective discount factor
 5:5; 15; 68, 125 Rotemberg cost of price adjustment
 0:125, 0:25; 0:5; 0:75 Calvo parameters
 8 Competitiveness
 1:6 Production Elasticity of Labour
v 1:7 Labour Supply Elasticity
 3; 5; 7 Elasticity of money demand
 0:3 Money demand parameter
The calculations of the seigniorage maximising ination rates for di¤erent mod-
els are given in table 2. For a wide range of parameter values we conclude that
the value of seigniorage maximizing ination declines in  and :
Table 2: SMIR for di¤erent models
Cagan flex Rotemberg Calvo
 = 7 12:0% 10:3% 9:2% 8:0% 5:4% 4:2% 7:4% 5:5% 2:8% 2:0%
 or  0 5:5 15 68 125 0:125 0:25 0:5 0:6
 = 5 20:0% 17:3% 13:8% 11:1% 6:5% 4:9% 9:1% 6:2% 3:0% 2:2%
 or  0 5:5 15 68 125 0:125 0:25 0:5 0:6
 = 3 44% 37% 20:9% 14:9% 7:7% 5:7% 10:5% 6:9% 3:3% 2:3%
 or  0 5:5 15 68 125 0:125 0:25 0:5 0:6
Here Cagan; flexi; Calvo; Rotemberg indicate the seigniorage maximizing in-
ation rate in our various models. One notes rst of all that both the Cagan
and the ex-price SMIRs imply high (double-digit) ination rates across all cal-
ibrations. Furthermore, the di¤erence between the Cagan and ex-price SMIRs
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is relatively small. As noted above, the Calvo model incorporates a distortion
entirely absent from the other models in that there is a relative price distortion
across rms. It turns out that distortion can be very costly; it implies that the
economy with sub-optimal price dispersion has a lower optimal ination rate
because (i) the labour input employed, (ii) the aggregate production costs, (iii)
the disutility from labour and (iv) transactions costs are all increasing in price
dispersion, for a given level of production. Moreover, the impact that price dis-
persion has is akin to, and of the order of magnitude of, a negative productivity
shock, as demonstrated by Damjanovic and Nolan (2006).
The seigniorage maximizing ination rate is lower in the Rotemberg framework
than in the exible price case, however it is higher than in Calvo setting. In the
Rotemberg model, the cost of price adjustment results in larger production as
ination rises. However, the consumers ultimately have to pay that cost, resulting
in lower consumption and therefore lower money demand.
In a sense these results conrm Kimbroughs assertion on the importance of
the labour-leisure choice in calculating SMIRs. However, our ndings suggest
that the existence or otherwise of price inexibility is of substantial qualitative
and quantitative signicance. Finally, it is interesting to note that the average
SMIR in the Calvo framework is a little over 5% across all calibrations, and around
3.5% if one excludes those calibrations that induce double-digit ination rates.
6. Conclusion
The paper compared four models qualitative assessments of, and quantitative
prescriptions for, the seigniorage maximizing ination rate. Along with the form
of the demand for money and the endogeneity of the labour-leisure choice, it was
argued that the seigniorage maximizing ination rate depends crucially on the
existence of price rigidity, and on the form that rigidity takes. A detailed analysis
of the reasons for these di¤erences was provided and of the role of ination in
distorting the labour market. Sticky price models predict substantially lower
SMIRs compared to the Cagan rule and a exible-price model. If our version
of the Calvo model (and our calibration) is to be believed, the level of ination
experienced recently in advanced economies such as the USA and the UK may be
quite close to the SMIR.
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7. Appendix
7.0.2. Deriving the Rotemberg Phillips Curve
The Rotemberg model developed here is very similar to the version of the Calvo
model except that all rms are identical; they post identical prices and there is no
aggregate price dispersion,  = 1: So, consumer preferences (2.1), labour supply
(2.6) and saving decision (2.7), production technology (2.12) and the equilibrium
in the goods market (2.24) are all identical to the Calvo set-up. However, the
price setting dynamics are di¤erent and can be described as follows. Firms set
prices maximizing the net present value of future prots:
t = Et
1X
k=0
dt+k
 
Yt+k

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
1 
  wt+kNt+k(i)  
2

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k 1(i)
  1
2!
= Et
1X
k=0
kdt+kYt+k

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
1 
  wt+kA t+kY t+k

Pt+k (i)
Pt+k
 
 Et
1X
k=0
kdt+k

2

Pt+k(i)
Pt+k
Pt+k
Pt+k 1
Pt+k 1
Pt+k 1(i)
  1
2
where wt is real wage wt = Wt=Pt; dened in (2.25).
The rst order condition with respect to Pt(i)
Pt
is 
  (1  )Yt

Pt(i)
Pt
 
+ wtA
 
t Y

t

Pt (i)
Pt
  1
  t

Pt(i)
Pt
t   1
!
+Etdt+1
 
t+1

Pt
Pt(i)
 2 
Pt+1(i)
Pt+1
t+1

Pt
Pt(i)
 1
  1
!!
: (7.1)
Since all the rms charge the same price, in equilibrium Pt(i)
Pt
= 1 which gives us
the Phillips curve:
  (1  )Yt + wtA t Y t   t (t   1) + Etdt+1 (t+1 (t+1   1)) = 0: (7.2)
That completes the derivation of the Phillips curve.
7.1. Calibration for the costs of price adjustment, 
For calibration purposes we equalized the slope of the Phillips curves across our
two sticky-price models (in the deterministic equilibrium with zero trend ina-
tion). For the Rotemberg model we need to log linearize (7.2) assuming constant
discounting, dt+1 = ; that implies (7.3)

(   1)
w
Y
Y 
 bwt + bYt   bAt  bYt = 
   1
1
Y
Et (bt   bt+1) : (7.3)
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For the Calvo model, combining (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22) we can derive rep-
resentation (7.4)

   1wtA
 
t Y

t  
 
1   1t
1  
! 1+( 1
(1 ) )
Yt (7.4)
= Et
24 1   1t
1  
! 1+( 1
(1 ) )
a 1t+1   at+1
 
1   1t+1
1  
! 1+( 1
(1 ) )
35 Xt+1;
where Xt+1 is dened as Xt+1 = adt;t+1
1P
k=0
kdt+1;t+1+k
h
Yt+k+1(
Pt+1
Pt+k+1
)1 
i
: That
implies that in steady state X = 
1 Y: The log-linearization of (7.4) results in
(7.5)

   1
wY 
Y
 bwt + bYt   bAt  bYt (7.5)
= (1   + ) 1
1  

1  Et [bt   bt+1] :
Clearly equations (??) and (7.5) are identical when it is the case that
 = Y (   1) (1   + ) 1
1  

1   ; (7.6)
here, Y is the steady state level of output from either (7.2) or (7.4). Also,.as
Y = 
 1wY
 the steady state wage is dened from (2.25) as w = (1+T+ik)
(1+T )
Y v+1;
and i =  1

: Using formula (7.6) we obtain the following correspondence between
price rigidity parameters in the Rotemberg and Calvo models.
 0:125 0:25 0:5 0:6
(a) 5:5 15 68 125
This calibration is used for the results reported in table 2.
8. Appendixes for Rotemberg model
8.1. Output
Proposition 3.1: In the model with costly price adjustment, output increases
with price stickiness, for any given level of ination.
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Proof. The equilibrium level of output solves equation (8.1)
(i)

Y   
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)   (   1)Y (8.1)
=  (1  ) (   1) :
One can di¤erentiate indirectly to receive
 (v + 1) (i)

Y   
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)
dY
Y
+(i)Y (v+1)dY   (   1) dY (8.2)
= d (   1) (1  ) + (i)

1
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)d:
This expression may be rewritten as
[ (v + 1)  1] (   1) dY +  (v + 1)  (   1) (   ) dY
Y
(8.3)
+(i)Y (v+1)dY
= (   1) (1  ) d+ (i)

1
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)d:
Since all coe¢ cient are positive, one may conclude that output increases with
price stickiness for @Y=@ > 0; which completes the proof.
Proposition 3.2: In the model with costly price adjustment, output increases
with ination, for any level of ination smaller than Cagans SMIR.
Proof. The equilibrium level of output solves equations (8.1). Again, one can
di¤erentiate indirectly to receive
 (v + 1) (i)

Y   
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)
dY
Y
+(i)Y (v+1)dY   (   1) dY
=  (1  ) (2   1) d
+2(i)

2
(   1)Y (v+1)d
 (i)

Y   
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)
@(i)
@i
@i
@
d:
This expression may be rewritten as
 (v + 1) ( (1  ) (   1)) dY
Y
+( (v + 1)  1) dY + (i)Y (v+1)dY
=  (1  ) (2   1) d ++2(i)
2
(   1)Y (v+1)d
 (i)

Y   
2
(   1)2

Y (v+1)
@(i)
@i
@i
@
d:
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All coe¢ cients are positive when @(i)
@i
< 0; which is true for any level of ination
smaller that Cagans SMIR. One may conclude that output increases with price
ination for @Y=@ > 0; which completes the proof.
8.2. Consumption and Seigniorage
Here we provide a proof for Proposition 3.3
Proposition 3.3: When the "convexity of labour" is small,  (v + 1) ' 1;
consumption and seigniorage revenue increase with  for any given level of ina-
tion,  > 1.
Proof. Recall that
C =
1
(1 + T (i))

Y   
2
(   1)2

Hence,
dC =
1
(1 + T (i))

dY   1
2
(   1)2 d

;
dS =
ik
(1 + T (i))

dY   1
2
(   1)2 d

:
Using formula (8.3)
[ (v + 1)  1] (   1)

dY   1
2
(   1)2 d

+ (v + 1)  (   1) (   ) 1
Y

dY   1
2
(   1)2 d

+(i)Y (v+1)

dY   1
2
(   1)2 d

=   [ (v + 1)  1] (   1) (1  ) d
 1
2
[ (v + 1)  1] (   1) (   1)2 d
+ (v + 1) (   1) (1  )

1  1
Y

2
(   1)2

d:
If  (v + 1) = 1 the right hand side is positive, which implies dC
d
> 0; dS
d
> 0.
9. Appendixes for Calvo Model
9.1. Labour demand
In this appendix it is shown that for a given level of production rms pay lower
wages in the Calvo model than with exible prices (i.e., our variant of Kimbrough
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(2006) which includes monopolistic competition). Recall equation (4.1)
wd_calvo = wd_flex g();
where g() =

1  1
1 
 1 +
1  1 
1  1 : Therefore to analyze the partial equilib-
rium one needs to investigate how g() changes with  and : The necessary
analysis is provided by direct di¤erentiation. That is,

@ log g()
@
=  1   + 
1  
(   1) 1
1   1  

1   +
(   1) 1
1   1
=   (   1) (1  )
 1
(1   1) (1   1) + 
 
 1
 
1   ( 1)
(1   1) (1  )
!
;
which is negative for  > ; where  < (1=)
1
 ( 1) ; and solves equation
 @ log g()
@
= 0; which is equivalent to (2.28)
For any ination level,  > 1; the wage o¤ered by rms declines in price
stickiness. Similarly, it follows from (9.1)
@ log g()
@
=   (1   + )
 
 1   1
(   1) (1   1) (1  )  

 
    1
1   < 0: (9.1)
9.2. Output in Calvo model
Proposition 2.2: Ination and output are negatively related in the Calvo model
for Cagan >  > 
Proof. We recall formula (2.27)
(Y=A)
(v+1)
=
h()(i)
v+1()
;
where h() := 1 

1  1
1  1
1  ; (i) =
1+T (i)
1+T (i)+ik(i)
; and = (1 )
(1 )

1  1
1 
 
 1
:
These terms were discussed in the main text. By direct di¤erentiation one can
prove that the positive e¤ect on output of a rise in ination by reducing the mo-
nopolistic distortion is smaller that the negative e¤ect due to the rise in price
distortion consequent on the same increase in ination:
It is easy to see that
 (v + 1)
@ log(Y )
@
=

@ log h
@
  @ (log)
@

  v @ (log)
@
+
@ log (i)
@
: (9.2)
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Below we establish that d(log)
d
> 0;

 d log h()
d
   d(log)
d

< 0 and d log()
di
< 0;
for Cagan >  > :

d (log)
d
=

1    

   1
(   1) 1
1   1 =

1    
 1
1   1 = (9.3)
= 
    1
(1  ) (1   1) > 0:

d log h()
d
=

1    

1   +
(   1) 1
1   1  
(   1) 1
1   1 =
= 
(1  )
(1  ) (1  )   (   1)
(1  ) 1
(1   1) (1   1) > 0:
Therefore:

d log h()
d
  d (log)
d
(9.4)
=   

1   +
(   1) 1
1   1  
(   1) 1
1   1 +
 1
1   1 =
=   
    1
(1  ) (1   1)   (   1)
 1 (1  )
(1   1) (1   1) ;
which is negative for  > , where  is dened as in above.
@ log()
@i
=
T 0
1 + T (i)
  T
0(i) + ik0(i) + k(i)
1 + T (i) + ik(i)
=
 k(i)
1 + T (i)
  ik
0(i)
1 + T (i) + ik(i)
=   k(i) + ik
0(i)
(1 + T (i)) (1 + T (i) + ik(i))
; (9.5)
which is negative for i < ic = 1=: Combining (9.4), (9.5) and (9.3) with (9.2)
one concludes that in the Calvo model output declines with ination for  > :
That completes the proof of proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.1: Output declines in the degree of price stickiness, ; for
 > 1:
Proof. To prove proposition 2.1 we shall use similar logic and show that equilib-
rium output declines with price stickiness
 (v + 1)
@ log(Y )
@
=

@ log h
@
  @ (log)
@

  v @ (log)
@
: (9.6)
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First we establish that @(log)
@
> 0 :
d log
d
=
   + 1
   1
1   1
(1   1) (1  ) +
 
    1
(1   1) (1  ) > 0: (9.7)
The proof of that statement is slightly more subtle. First one needs to recognize
that d log
d (=1)
= 0; then one computes the second derivative

d2 log
@@
= 
 

(1  )2
  
 1
(1   1)2
!
> 0;
which is positive for  < 1: Since d log
d
is a strictly increasing function in 
and d log
d
(1) = 0; it follows that d log
d
() > 0 for  > 1: Next
d log h
d
=
 
1   +
 1
1   1  
 1
1   1 +

1   ;
=
(1  )
(1  ) (1  )  
(1  ) 1
(1   1) (1   1) > 0:
To some extent the function h represents the benecial impact of ination in
the Calvo model. However the positive e¤ect on output of the reduction in the
monopolistic distortion is completely o¤set by the negative e¤ect from the relative
price distortion:
h()= =
1  
1   1

1   1
1  
  1 
 1
:
Hence,
d log h
d
  d log
d
= (9.8)
 
1   +
 1
1   1 +
   1  
   1

1
1    
 1
1   1

< 0:
Again, combining (9.7) and (9.8) with (9.6) one concludes that in the Calvo model
output declines with price stickiness for any  > 1: That completes the proof of
proposition 2.2
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